Reading Aristotle: Physics 2.2: Physics, Math, and Metaphysics

*Note: Instead of giving line by line commentary as I normally do, for at least the first part of this chapter I’m just going to be giving commentary on the main points with a few quotes added throughout. This is because I think there’s less in the first part that needs to be worked out in detail.

In the first chapter of Book Two of the Physics, Aristotle distinguished between natural and artificial things, where to be “natural” is to have an intrinsic nature; he then argued that things do in fact have such intrinsic natures, and that the nature of a thing is related primarily to its form. The second chapter begins with a discussion on the difference between physics as a science and mathematics as a science. Since physics is the science that studies nature, having in chapter one established what nature is, it makes sense for Aristotle now to consider how physics studies nature in relation to other sciences. Continue reading

Reading Aquinas on Evil: Is Evil in Good? (Q. 1, Art. 2)

In the First Article of Question One of the De Malo, which we examined in the previous post of this series, Aquinas concluded that evil is not an entity, i.e. it has no positive existence of its own; rather it is a privation or perversion of some good. We turn now to the Second Article, which asks: “Is There Evil in Good?” Aquinas answers in the affirmative. Continue reading

Beginning Metaphysics IV: Essentialism

Central to Aquinas’s whole metaphysical system, and even central to his whole project of metaphysics, is the belief that essences are real. This is known as essentialism. Modern science and philosophy, however, have come so far from the common sense position that things have essences that to even ask the question is seen as a waste of time. This post is meant as a brief introductory look at an overview of arguments that could be presented in favor of an essentialist position.

By far the greatest reason to affirm essentialism is that it is just our starting point for understanding, describing, and interacting with reality. Whether we realize it our not, we are all at least implicit essentialists: we all look at and talk about reality as if there really are things with intrinsic unity which are distinct from other things and other kinds of things. Continue reading

Reading Aristotle: Physics 2.1: What is Nature?

*Note: I said that before I began commentary on Book 2, I’d write an outline of Book 1. Unfortunately that project is taking longer than I expected. I still intend to complete it, but thought in the meantime I would go ahead and begin Book 2 anyways.

Having completed Book One of the Physics, in which Aristotle explored the fundamental principles of nature, we turn now to Book Two, which begins with asking what nature itself is:

“Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes. ‘By nature’ the animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water)–for we say that these and the like exist ‘by nature’. All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration). On the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations — i. e. in so far as they are products of art — have no innate impulse to change. But in so far as they happen to be composed of stone or of earth or of a mixture of the two, they do have such an impulse, and just to that extent–which seems to indicate that nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute” (Physics 2.1, 192b8-23) [1].

As Aquinas points out, Book One of the Physics was primarily directed towards the “principles of natural things”, whereas Book Two is primarily directed towards the “principles of natural science” itself (Lectio 1.141) [2]. To know the principles of any science, we must first know “its subject and the method by which it demonstrates” [3]. And the subject of natural science is, of course, nature; hence the discussion of the definition of nature. Continue reading

A Thomistic Argument from Desire: Part I

A few months ago, I posted an Augustinian Argument from Desire, which attempted to use material from the writings of St. Augustine in order to address what I felt to be the principle problems for any “argument from desire” for the existence of God. The Augustinian version is interesting and, I think, deserves to be fleshed out more fully; but in this post I am beginning a new project: a Thomistic Argument from Desire. This is primarily going to be an endeavor of research, not defense. In other words, I am going to be delving into material from St. Thomas which I am inclined to think can plausibly be constructed into a successful argument, but which I have not as of yet completely mapped out. I have a general idea of what I think the flow and structure of the argument will perhaps look like, but that is certainly liable to change. Furthermore, my presentation of the argument will largely take the form of exposition. For the most part, I think the argument is pretty much already there, at least materially and implicitly, in the writings of St. Thomas, and my task will be concerned with drawing it out. Continue reading

Reading Aquinas On Evil: Is Evil an Entity? (Q. 1, Art. 1)

This is the beginning of a series reading through St. Thomas Aquinas’s work De Malo or “On Evil”.

I’ve interacted in a few posts with several arguments for atheism/naturalism, but have purposefully not yet ventured towards that infamous, so-called “problem of evil”. This is because the question of the relation between evil and the existence of God is massive, complex, and doesn’t fit neatly under the heading of one general “problem”. There are many different arguments and types of arguments which move from the reality of evil (or something which might be categorized under evil, such as pain, suffering, etc.) towards the improbability or even impossibility of the existence of God. Recognizing the immensity and complexity of the various issues involved, I’ve chosen not to delve into it yet, and am doing so now only by way of exposition of Aquinas’ own writings on the subject. There are several reasons for this. First is just that I think what Aquinas has to say is interesting and significant in its own right. Second is that starting this way, by reading and thinking through a single text, narrows the topic considerably, providing a nice pathway by which to broach discussing evil and God generally. Finally, any argument which attempts to appeal to “evil” without establishing a sufficient metaphysical foundation of evil first is just futile. The same, by the way, is true of any theistic arguments which appeal to moral obligation or values. It is simply impossible to take serious any attempt at an argument from evil which does not provide an ontological account of what evil is in the first place. Continue reading

Outlined Version of the Design Argument

Here is an outlined version of Aquinas’s Argument from Design, or his Fifth Way. This is just an outline. The full series of articles can be found here, here, and here. Refer to those for the whole, in depth explanations and defenses of the various premises.

  1. In our universe we experience regular cause-effect relationships, where causes have specific, determinate effects
  2. The only sufficient metaphysical explanation of these cause-effect relationships is the principle of finality, which states that causes are intrinsically directed/ordered to determinate effects as ends
  3. In order for a cause to be intrinsically ordered/directed to a determinate effect as to an end, that effect/end must in some sense exist prior to the action of the cause
  4. But an effect cannot exist in real being prior to the action of the cause, because then the effect would be prior to its cause, which is absurd
  5. So the effect/end must exist in the order of mental being, as an idea, prior to the causal action
  6. Hence the ends of all causal actions must exist in some Supreme Intelligence which directs those causes to their ends.
  7. These ends are intrinsic to the nature/essence of the beings which act causally, so what directs the beings to their ends must be likewise the cause of the existence of those essences/natures, which (per the Second Way) must be a Being of Pure Act, or Being Itself
  8. This is what we call God