Aquinas’s Argument from Contingency for the Existence of God: Introduction

This is the first post in my third series looking at arguments for the existence of God. I finished the last one a few months ago, which focused on Aquinas’s Second Way, or the First Cause argument (to read those, click these links: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Outlined Version). Before that I looked at Aquinas’s First Way, or the Prime Mover argument (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Outlined Version). This new series will be examining Aquinas’s Third Way, or the Argument from Contingency for the existence of God.

Before we begin, however, it is necessary to look at relevant contexts and concepts for understanding the argument. The Third Way, along with the previous two ways, are all cosmological arguments. A cosmological argument is not so named because it has anything to do with the modern scientific field of cosmology; rather it comes from the greek word kosmos which refers to the existence and order of the world/universe.

Outlined Version of the First Cause Argument

Here is the outlined version of Aquinas’s First Cause Argument for the existence of God, also known as the Second Way. The full series of articles can be found here, here, here, and here. Refer to those articles for full, in depth explanations and defenses for the premises.

The very, very condensed version of the argument argument:

1. Our senses observe essentially ordered series of efficient causes
2. Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself
3. Therefore, either the series of efficient causes must have a first cause, a circular regress, or an infinite regress
4. Essentially ordered series cannot have a circular or infinite regress
5. Therefore, there must be a first cause

The more precise, expanded version:

1. Our senses observe that there are efficient causes
2. Some instances of efficient causes exist in essentially ordered series. Such instances include composite beings, beings which operate within a system, and beings whose essences are distinct from the act of existing and therefore must be conjoined and conserved
3. Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself
4. Therefore, either the series of efficient causes must have a first cause, a circular regress, or an infinite regress
5. Essentially ordered series cannot have a circular or infinite regress
6. Therefore, there must be a First Cause

What can we know about the First Cause?

1. Efficient causation is the actualization of potency
2. As the Prime Mover argument demonstrates, essentially ordered series of potency reduced to act must ultimately lead to a Being of Pure Act
3. Therefore, the First Cause is a Being of Pure Act
4. For those beings whose essences are distinct from the act of existing, the First Cause must be a being whose essence and existence are identical
5. A being whose essence and existence are identical is Pure Being, Pure Existence, Subsistent Being Itself
6. Therefore, the First Cause is Subsistent Being Itself
7. The First Cause, since it is Pure Act, has no potencies
8. Anything that changes has potencies
9. Therefore, the First Cause cannot change (is immutable)
10. In order to distinguish objects from other objects, they must have unrealized potencies
11. Two or more beings of Pure Act would have no potencies, and thus would be indistinguishable, and thus identical
12. Therefore the First Cause is one
13. All material objects have potencies
14. Therefore, the First Cause cannot be material (is immaterial)
15. To come into or go out of existence is to change
16. Therefore, the First Cause can never have come into, and can never go out of, existence (is eternal)
17. Every being which exists within time has potencies
18. Therefore, the First Cause cannot exist within time (is timeless)

So far we have established one First Cause that is Pure Act and Subsistent Being Itself, making it immutable, immaterial, eternal, and timeless. But there’s more

1. The First Cause, as Pure Act, ultimately actualizes all potencies, so it is the ultimate efficient cause of everything that happens
2. Furthermore, as Subsistent Being Itself, it is Pure Existence, and everything else that exists derives its very existence from it
3. Thus it can be said to be “all powerful” in the relevant sense (is omnipotent)
4. There are several arguments for the personhood/intelligence of the First Cause
   1. Argument from the Nature of Immaterial Beings:
      1. All material beings are composites of form and matter
      2. All material beings are capable of instantiating only one form at a time, because they are limited by their material nature
      3. An immaterial being would not be limited by material nature, and thus could instantiate multiple forms at once
      4. When an immaterial being instantiates multiple forms, it is said to grasp/understand/conceive of that form. This is what intellect is
      5. The First Cause is immaterial
      6. Therefore the First Cause has intellect
   2. Argument from Proportionate Causality:
   3. 1. All causes must contain their effects either eminently or formally
      2. The First Cause is the ultimate cause of all human attributes
      3. Therefore, the being of Pure Act must contain human attributes either eminently or formally
      4. Many human attributes are material in nature
      5. The being of Pure Act is immaterial
      6. Therefore, the being of Pure Act can only be said to contain these physical/material attributes eminently
      7. Some human attributes, such as personhood and moral nature, are immaterial
      8. Thus the being of Pure Act could be said to contain these attributes formally
      9. Therefore, we can say that the being of Pure Act contains personhood and a moral nature (albeit analogically)

Thus we arrive at one being that is the First Cause of everything, that is Pure Act and Subsistent Being Itself, that from which every other being derives its very existence, which is immutable, immaterial, timeless, eternal, omnipotent, and personal. And this Being we can rightly call God.

 

*Important Note: The argument as presented above is not meant as a syllogism. The argument could be constructed into the format of a syllogism, but the above presentation is not meant to be that. This post is just meant as a general outline of the full, in depth, fleshed out argument as found in the articles linked to above. I will be from time to time editing and refining this outline so as to make it more efficient and less susceptible to criticism. Check back for updates.

Aquinas’s First Cause Argument, Part 4: Conclusion

This is the fourth and final post in my series on Aquinas’s First Cause Argument for the existence of God, also known as the Second Way. So far, in the previous posts (which can be found here, here, and here) we have established that there are efficient causes, that there are some instances of efficient causes which exist in essentially ordered series, and that these series must terminate in a First Cause. In the second post we established that two types of efficient causes which exist in essentially ordered series are composite beings and beings which operate within a system (Clarke, The One and the Many). We also noted, however, that on a superficial level, it would appear that for an object to “begin” to exist seems to just present us with an accidentally ordered series, rather than an essentially ordered one. But when we examine the deeper metaphysical principles, we discover that this is not actually the case. All the objects around us have an essence which is distinct from their act of existence, and thus something must conjoin the essences with the acts of existence when the object begins to exist, and conserve the essence with an act of existence while it continues to exist here and now from moment to moment. This itself comprises an essentially ordered series which must also terminate in a First Cause. Furthermore, the First Cause of this series, since it conjoins and conserves the essence and act of existence in those beings in which the two are distinct, must itself have an essence which is identical with its act of existence. In other words, there must exist something whose essence just is existence, something which is not a being, but rather Being Itself, Pure Existence, Pure Being, which Aquinas calls “Subsistent Being Itself.”

Aquinas’s First Cause Argument, Part 3: Essence and Existence

This is the third post in a series on Aquinas’s Second Way, or the First Cause Argument for the existence of God. In the first post I set forth some preliminary issues which it is important to understand before examining the argument. Of these issues, the most significant two are that Aquinas’s First Cause Argument is entirely different from other first cause arguments, such as the popular Kalam Cosmological Argument. The Kalam is dependent upon the universe having had a beginning; the Second Way is not. Secondly, I noted that the notion of causality itself has been contested by modern philosophers and scientists, and I explained

Outlined Version of the Prime Mover Argument

My articles on the Prime Mover Argument for the existence of God (here, here, and here), also known as Aquinas’s First Way, are a bit lengthy and technical. This is needed for a full understanding/appreciation of the argument. However, it can take some time to really get through them. As such, I thought it might be useful to post a condensed, outlined version of the argument, in the form of a syllogism:

1. Our senses observe that motion really exists
2. Motion is a potency reduced to act
3. Potency can only be reduced to act by another which is itself already in act
4. Essentially ordered series of such motion must either terminate in a prime mover (which is Pure Act), or else have a circular or an infinite regress
5. Essentially ordered causal series of such motion cannot in principle have a circular or an infinite regression
6. Therefore, there must exist a prime mover, which is a being of Pure Act

Now, what can we know about this being of Pure Act?

1. A being of Pure Act is, by definition, purely actual, with absolutely no potencies
2. Anything that changes has potencies
3. Therefore, the being of Pure Act cannot change (is immutable)
4. In order to distinguish objects from other objects, they must have potencies
5. Two or more beings of Pure Act would have no potencies, and thus would be indistinguishable, and thus identical
6. Thus we can say that there is only one being of Pure Act (is one)
7. All material objects have potencies
8. Therefore, the being of Pure Act cannot be material (is immaterial)
9. To come into or go out of existence is to change
10. Therefore, the being of Pure Act can never have come into, and can never go out of, existence (is eternal)
11. Every being which exists within time has potencies
12. Therefore, the being of Pure Act cannot exist within time (is timeless)

So far we have established one being of Pure Act which is immutable, immaterial, and timeless. This already takes us to a conception of God. What more can be said?

1. The being of Pure Act ultimately actualizes all potencies, so it is the ultimate cause of everything
2. Thus it can be said to be “all powerful” (is omnipotent)
3. The being of Pure Act is immaterial (see pt. 7-8 above)
4. It is possible that all immaterial beings can be said to be personal beings (for a defense/explanation of this, see part 3 of my Prime Mover series)
5. Furthermore, all causes must contain their effects either eminently or formally
6. The being of Pure Act is the ultimate cause of all human attributes
7. Therefore, the being of Pure Act must contain human attributes either eminently or formally
8. Many human attributes are material in nature
9. The being of Pure Act is immaterial
10. Therefore, the being of Pure Act can only be said to contain these physical/material attributes eminently
11. Some human attributes, such as personhood and moral nature, are immaterial
12. Thus the being of Pure Act could be said to contain these attributes formally
13. Therefore, we can say that the being of Pure Act contains personhood and a moral nature (albeit analogically)

Thus we have arrived at a being which is one, Pure Act, immutable, immaterial, timeless, eternal, omnipotent, and personal; and this being we call God.

To see the argument fully fleshed out, with each of the premises defended and key objections responded to, see the articles linked to above.

Aquinas’s First Cause Argument, Part 2: Efficient Causes

In my first post on Aquinas’s First Cause Argument for the existence of God, I discussed several preliminary issues which it is important to understand/note before beginning to look at the argument itself. Here’s a recap of those preliminary issues:

1. Aquinas’s First Cause Argument, or the Second Way, is just one particular version of many first cause/cosmological arguments, the most popular of which is the Kalam. It is important to distinguish the Kalam from Aquinas’s Second Way: the Kalam is based upon the premise that the entire universe began to exist, the Second Way is not.
2. The notion of “causation” itself is extremely contested amongst both scientists and philosophers, especially due to modern thinkers such as Hume and Russell. The deeper metaphysics of causation can be complicated, and I’ll be getting into it a little bit, but, for reasons which I made clear in the last article, I will be taking the reality of causation as a given.
3. This argument seeks to establish the existence of a “first cause.” This does not mean a cause which is first temporally in a series, but rather a cause which is first in causal power, meaning it is more fundamental than all other causes.
4. The Second Way is, in many ways, extremely similar to the First Way (see my posts on the First Way here, here, and here), and there are different ways to interpret it. I will be discussing this issue further in this post and future ones.

With all of that having been laid out and hopefully made clear, let’s begin to take a look at the argument itself, using Aquinas’s own words as a starting point for examination/extrapolation.

Aquinas’s First Cause Argument for the Existence of God: Preliminary Issues

Several weeks ago, I finished a lengthy trilogy of posts on an ancient argument for the existence of God known as the Prime Mover Argument (the first can be found here, the second here, and the third here). In that series, I mentioned in passing that the argument, though originating with Aristotle, was also built upon by the great St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas actually used five main arguments to establish the existence of God, which are called the “Five Ways.” The Prime Mover Argument, which I explained and defended in that trilogy, is the First Way. This article is the beginning of a new series, looking at the Second Way, which is known as the First Cause Argument.

Before looking at the argument itself, there are a number of preliminary issues that it is important to understand or at least note. The first is that there are many different “first cause” arguments, and Aquinas’s Second Way is just one example of such. First cause arguments, also known as cosmological arguments (not because they necessarily have anything to do with the scientific field of cosmology, but rather because they start from facts about the world or kosmos in Greek) generally seek to establish the existence of

Prime Mover Part 3: Final Objections

This is the third and (hopefully) final post concerning the famous Prime Mover argument for the existence of God. In the first post I set forth the argument and claimed that it established the existence of a “being of Pure Act.” In the second post I responded to some common objections, and also explained why the being of Pure Act is “God,” in that the being of Pure Act must be one, immaterial, timeless, omnipotent, and immutable. I also claimed that it is somewhat irrelevant whether or not the Prime Mover argument alone is sufficient to establish that this being of Pure Act is personal. If such a being exists, who is purely actual, immaterial, timeless, omnipotent, and immutable, that is at least enough to prove false non theistic world views such as atheism and naturalism.

But besides this, I also made the comment that it is possible to show that the being of Pure Act is personal, although it is admittedly a bit less clear than with other attributes. In this final post, then, I’d like to accomplish the following: 1) show that the being of Pure Act is indeed personal, and 2) respond to more in depth, complicated objections to the argument.

The first argument used to show that the being of Pure Act is “personal” claims that all immaterial beings must be personal. In order to understand this claim, we first need to understand a bit of the underlying metaphysics. For Aristotle and Aquinas,

Prime Mover Part 2: Who is the Prime Mover?

In my last post, I left off with a bit of a cliff hanger. In that article, I presented an ancient and sometimes overlooked (in the contemporary climate) argument for the existence of God, called the Prime Mover argument, or the argument from motion, which is Aquinas’ famous First Way. I argued in that post that the proof shows the existence of a being which is “Pure Act,” and I made the claim that this being is God. But why should we think that, if some being of Pure Act does in fact exist, this being is God, or even anything like God? For that matter, who is “God” anyways?

First, before I continue, let me give a very brief summary of the argument presented in the last post:

1. Our experience via our senses observes that there exist objects/beings in motion
2. Motion is a potency raised/reduced to act
3. A potency can only be raised to act by another which is itself already in act
4. Essentially ordered causal series of such motion cannot in principle have an infinite regress
5. Therefore, there must exist a being who is Pure Act

What does it mean to be a being of Pure Act? Well, as its name quite obviously tells us, this being is purely actual, that is, it has no potencies able to be actualized. It is fully, totally, in act. It is an “unmoved mover,” the source and cause of all motion that we see here and now in existence. It is the first or “prime” mover.

This argument has been around for a very long time, and it has garnered a very large amount of responses/critiques/objections. In this post, I’ll examine some of the most common, frequently encountered objections. Here’s a preliminary list:

1. Why think the being of Pure Act is God?
2. In particular, why think the being of Pure Act is sentient/personal/conscious?
3. Quantum physics has undermined the act/potency premises. Objects are seen to change randomly, without any sort of external cause.
4. Newton’s laws of motion undermine the act/potency premises
5. How does the unmoved mover move anything?

Now, before I begin my analysis of these objections, I’d like to

Prime Mover: An Amateur Defense

The “Prime Mover” argument is perhaps the oldest and most significant argument for the existence of God in the history of philosophy. Originating with Aristotle himself, it was revived and reasserted by the great Thomas Aquinas, who held it as the strongest proof for the existence of God. The Prime Mover argument comprises the first of Aquinas’ famous “Five Ways,” and it is the argument he spent the greatest amount of time and space in his writings defending. Despite this argument’s impressive history and importance to the philosophical tradition, it has largely gone out of “style” (as it were) in contemporary philosophy/apologetics. Today, the “Big Three” arguments used to establish/defend God’s existence are 1) the Kalam Cosmological argument, 2) the Fine Tuning argument, and 3) the Moral Argument. These are not by any means the only or even the best arguments being used today, but even just a cursory reading of relevant material should suffice to show that these arguments appear more frequently, especially to popular “apologetic” audiences. The prominence of the first two of these arguments is due largely to advances in modern cosmology. For example, the Kalam Cosmological argument originated from Islamic thinkers (versions of it actually go back much further, but Islamic thinkers, and some Jewish philosophers, really established it) and today has been robustly reintroduced and defended by William Lane Craig, largely due to the revolutionary turn in thinking in the 20th century regarding the physical beginning of the universe, namely, that our universe did have a beginning in time at the “Big Bang.” The Fine Tuning argument likewise arose out of the discovery of modern physicists that the fundamental forces of our universe had to be finely “tuned” for life to be even possible at all, and the chances of this are so astronomically minuscule that the best explanation seems to be (according to defenders of the argument) a supernatural designer. The moral argument has not emerged due to any scientific advancement (although conversations about the relation of morality to evolutionary biology are interesting and relevant), but, I would put forward, owe’s its popularity to C. S. Lewis’ famous discussion of the argument in his classic Mere Christianity.

All three of these arguments are certainly significant and worth exploring/talking about, and I do happen to find at least parts of the arguments convincing and otherwise successful. However, they are, in many respects,