Right now, we exist in an extremely politically divided and tension filled time; and I certainly do not in any way wish to add to this. As such, I am very much hesitant about posting on this or related topics. But since several questions were brought to me personally, I thought it might be appropriate to respond. Before I do so, however, I need to make fully clear my intentions in this post:
- In this post, I am not attempting to mount a positive argument in support of any sort of pro-life or anti-abortion ethical/political stance. I am both of those things, but I am not arguing positively for them here. Since I have not yet written much at all about ethics, I do not yet have a sufficient foundation for doing so
- In this post, I am also not arguing against any general pro-choice or pro-abortion stance. I will be arguing against some specific pro-choice arguments, as will be qualified below, but am not universally asserting opposition to all pro-choice and pro-abortion stances as such (again, I am opposed to these things, but am not here trying to argue against them generally).
- In this post, I am responding to several anti pro-life arguments and arguments in favor for choice/abortion. I am responding to these specific arguments here because they were presented to me personally, and because I happen to think they are very poor arguments that entirely miss the point of the debate. There may be serious arguments in favor of a pro-choice stance, but, I contend, the arguments I’m considering here very much are not. So if you personally do not think abortion is morally wrong or are in favor of a pro-choice stance, please do not consider this post a general opposition to your views. I respect your position and would gladly hold a more extended conversation about such.
- I am not assuming here the truth of or commitment to any religious traditions or associated beliefs. In other words, I will not be arguing on the basis of any religious beliefs. I will be arguing entirely on the basis of my own purely philosophical commitments.
So, with these preliminary notes having been established, we can begin. Conversations about the ethics or legality of abortion can be complex, but I take it that the crux of the whole issue is the status of the unborn. In general, it is good to make distinctions between 1) the ethical nature of some action, and 2) the legal nature of some action. Some actions may very well be immoral, and yet arguably should not be legally restricted (telling a little, inconsequential lie to a friend, for instance. I’m not aware of many people who think such a thing out to be punishable under law, however reprehensible it is). Some actions are entirely morally neutral and yet carry legal significance (driving on the left side of the road is not some intrinsically wrong action, but in a country where it is legally prescribed to drive on the right side of the road, driving on the left suddenly gains added meaning, not to mention danger to the self and others). Abortion, however, I think can be simplified. We might generally assume that, under most circumstances, to kill another person is morally wrong, and very much ought to be legally restricted. We will henceforth refer to the killing of another human person without justifiable reason simply as “murder”. Assuming that all murder as such is a great wrong and should definitely be legally prohibited, we can conclude that if abortion amounts to murder, abortion is therefore a great wrong and should definitely be legally prohibited.
Of course, in reality, the issue is much more complex. Because it is very possible that abortion does not amount to murder, and yet that it still might be wrong and worthy of legal prohibition. For instance, senseless killing of pets is not “murder” in the full sense, and yet some might still consider it as a crime worthy of legal consequence. This is, again, a very simplistic example, but for our purposes it is enough to point out that if abortion is equivalent to murder, than it is certainly wrong and legally condemnable, but even if it is not equivalent to murder, it still might be wrong and legally condemnable. So the primary and crucial issue in determining the morality and legality of abortion is in determining the “status” of the unborn. Does terminating the unborn amount to murdering a human being, and, if not, what does it amount to? Some might pose the question as “does the unborn have a ‘right to life'”, but since I find the modern notion of rights problematic, I won’t refer to it as such. Instead, I’ll use the term “dignity”, where possessing human dignity refers to the fact that it would be morally wrong and legally condemnable to kill that thing. In other words, I’ll take dignity to refer to just whatever it is about a human being that makes it morally wrong and legally condemnable to murder that human being. Again, note that I recognize that these issues are much, much, vastly more complex than I am making them out to be. I’m simplifying here for my purposes, which shall become evident as we continue. Also note: technically, some might distinguish between a “human being” as a biological organism and a “human person” as a human individual with a “right to life”. For now, I’m not making use of this distinction. Just know that I allow for it as a possibility. In other words, we might end up concluding that an unborn embryo or fetus does not have this “dignity” which makes it wrong to take the life thereof. That’s the very question on the table. We aren’t here assuming the precise qualifications for having this “dignity”, we’re just stating that this dignity is whatever it might be that makes it wrong to take the life of some human.
My position–which, again, I’m not trying to mount a positive defense of here–is that it is indeed morally wrong and legally condemnable to take the life of the unborn, at any stage from conception to birth. I hold this position as an essentialist and a natural law theorist. In other words, I hold that abortion at any stage does in fact amount to murder of a human life, and that it does so because the “dignity” of human life is rooted in the human essence, and any living human organism (which, I think, includes everything from the zygote onward) possesses the human essence and hence possesses the human “dignity”. Many people are not essentialists or natural law theorists and so will very much disagree with me, which is fine. I must reiterate again: I am not positively arguing for any of these positions here. I’m just pointing out what my own position is and that I hold it because of my philosophical beliefs about the status of the unborn. I think that unborn humans possess human dignity; in other words, whatever it might be that makes it wrong to kill a human adult, I think is present in unborn humans and hence makes it equally as wrong to take the life therefrom.
In my opinion, the best way to argue against the position I’ve just presented is to argue against essentialism. You might not even have to argue against the truth of essentialism generally; you might just argue that “dignity” is not due to the human essence but something else, and that something else is such that it allows for dignity to be present in post-birth humans but not the unborn. As far as I can see, this track is the strongest case against my essentialist anti-abortion stance. The following arguments, in comparison, do not, in my opinion, really answer the crucial points in favor of a pro-life philosophy. Most of these, which I will be responding to, are taken from an article which can be found here, shared to me by the author.
Argument 1: Abortion should be legally available because many illegal abortion practices are unsafe and result in harm and even death to the mother.
In support of this, the author, Babinski, makes several points:
- One woman dies every 7 minutes around the world due to an unsafe illegal abortion. Women who undergo illegal abortions are those who are very poor and do not have access to family planning facilities for education and prevention of unwanted pregnancies.
- Making abortion illegal or legal has no effect on the total number of abortions performed in the world. Making abortion legal dramatically reduces maternal morbidity and mortality.
- Nearly 50% of pregnancies that occur yearly are unwanted with nearly ½ of those pregnant women terminating their pregnancy. In essence; 42 million choose to terminate their pregnancy with close to half of those (20 million) being illegal. 
Response 1: Consequences of unsafe illegal abortions, while sad, are irrelevant to the ontological question of the status of the unborn and the intrinsic morality of termination thereof.
To see this, consider an example. Suppose, some time in the future, all guns were completely outlawed and all destroyed. Now suppose that some people begin to manufacture guns illegally, but these guns are poorly made and defective, with the result that around a quarter of the time, when used, they explode and cause harm and death to the user. So, we might say, whenever these guns are used as attempted murder weapons, theres a 25% chance that they end up killing the wielded as well as his attempted victim. It seems to me that it makes about as much sense to say that we should therefore (in this hypothetical future) make guns legal since attempted murderers have a much higher chance of harming themselves with illegal guns than they do with legally manufactured guns, as it does to say that abortion should be legal because illegal abortions are much more unsafe and dangerous. Obviously the analogies have important differences, one of which being that guns have a wide variety of purposes beyond just killing, but I think the point stands. If abortion amounts to murder, then it just doesn’t matter for the question of morality and legality whether or not illegal abortions are unsafe. The argument in effect is contending that whether or not abortions are legal, women will still get abortions, so they should just be legal so that they can do so safely. But, if abortion does in fact amount to murder, then that’s about as sensical as saying that we should just make murder legal since whether or not it’s legal, people will attempt murders anyways. Whether or not people do a thing is irrelevant to the question of whether or not that thing is right or wrong in itself. The central question is whether abortion amounts to murder. If it does, then of course it should be just as legally condemnable as murder itself is. If not, then that raises further questions, but the present argument just doesn’t deal with these fundamental issues.
Argument 2: Over-population is a dire problem that could negatively affect the entire human race and the entire planet, and abortion acts to slow population growth.
He uses China as an example, quoting Pat Robertson:
“Theyʼve got 1.2 billion people and they donʼt know what to do . . . If every family over there was allowed to have three or four children, the population would be completely unsustainable” .
Elsewhere, Babinski wrote directly to me: “[There are] almost 8 billion humans, diminishing rain forests [and] species, ocean gyres of plastics, [is this] not enough human life [for you]?” In effect, over-population is environmentally disastrous, and abortion curbs over-population.
Response 2: The effects of abortions on population size are completely irrelevant to the question of the intrinsic moral standing of abortion in itself.
The response here is similar to the previous one. If abortion amounts to murder, then one can only justify it as a means of population-size restraining insofar as one can justify murder generally as a means of population-size restraining. If it is wrong and legally condemnable to murder people in order to slow population growth, and if abortion amounts to murder, then it is equally as wrong and legally condemnable to abort the unborn.
In saying this, I am in no way denying the very serious problem of over population. What I am denying is that this problem can have any bearing whatsoever on the intrinsic moral/legal standing of abortion, if abortion amounts to murder. Once again, the fundamental question is whether or not abortion amounts to murder, and, if it does, assuming that murder is morally wrong and legally condemnable, then population concerns cannot even in principle justify abortion.
As should be clear by now, Babinski and I are working on very different and conflicting moral frameworks. He seems to be very consequentialist in nature, i.e. for him, the effects of actions seem to have serious weight on the moral standing of those actions. For him, it seems that if allowing abortion leads to positive consequences, while not allowing abortion leads to negative ones, then we should allow abortion. For me, while consequences are of moral import, they are somewhat secondary to the question of the intrinsic moral standing of the action, in itself. For me, if abortion in itself is morally wrong, then even if allowing it might bring about some positive consequences, it is still wrong. Moreover, in Thomistic terms, these consequences are accidental to the action, not essential. In other words, we can easily imagine some alien planet where abortion could never be unsafe, even if illegal, so legally restricting abortion could never have the negative consequence of leading to harm from unsafe abortions. Similarly, we can easily imagine some planet where over-population is not an issue at all, so abortion would not have the positive consequence of curbing over-population. Indeed, we could easily imagine some planet where the alien species is endangered, so abortion’s effect on population growth would in fact be very negative. All this to say that these types of consequences are accidental and non-essential to abortion in itself, and so, while of some import of consideration, are just irrelevant to the question of the intrinsic moral standing of abortion in itself.
Argument 3: “God/Nature are abortionists”.
“Many conceptions do not mature properly and are naturally aborted. And a fairly high percentage (20-30% or more?) of people born as single individuals used to be twins in the womb but one of them was reabsorbed into the womb or into the other twin.
Even the pro-lifer, Dr. John Collins Harvey, admits, ‘Products of conception [often] die at either the zygote, morula, or blastocyst stage. They never reach the implant stage but are discharged in the menstrual flow of the next period. It is estimated that [this]occurs in more than 50 percent of conceptions. In such occurrences, a woman may never even know that she has been pregnant'” .
This is somewhat similar to an argument made by popular science spokesman Bill Nye in a video. He asks:
“If you’re going to say that when an egg is fertilized it therefore has the same rights as an individual, then whom are you going to sue, whom are you going to imprison, every woman who’s had a fertilized egg pass through her? Every guy whose sperm has fertilized an egg and then it didn’t become a human? Have all these people failed you?
. . . I know it’s your interpretation of a book written fifty centuries ago, that it makes you think that when a man and a woman have sexual intercourse they always have a baby, but that’s wrong. So to pass laws based on that belief is inconsistent with nature . . . Nobody likes abortion, but you can’t tell somebody what to do. She has rights over this” .
Elsewhere, the argument is put like this:
“God is the world’s greatest abortionist, and God evidently hates babies.
How many embryos and fetuses never make it to birth? How many babies die in natural childbirth? How many infants die before reaching age five? The statistics are not good. The most hazardous journey of life is the first few months . . . as few as one-quarter of all conceptions avoid reabsorption or miscarriage, and of those fetuses that do make it to full-term, another large percentage die during natural childbirth. It’s obvious that embryos are not well-designed for making it to infancy” .
Babinski himself asked me directly: “What penalties do you intend to impose on your God for murdering 75% of all human zygotes?”
Response 3: So there seem to be several different facets to this particular argument. I’ll list what I see as the main, simplified versions thereof:
- Death of the unborn is frequent and entirely natural, so abortion is in keeping “with nature” and so should be allowed.
- From Nye: if a fertilized egg has same “rights” (I’ll use “dignity” instead) as an individual, who can you blame/penalize for every fertilized egg that doesn’t make it to birth by way of natural causes?
- From Nye: Anti-abortion arguments are based on the belief that all sexual intercourse leads to pregnancy and birth, but that’s false; many or most instances of sexual intercourse do not lead to the birth of a child, so abortion should be allowed.
- From Nye: You cannot tell somebody what to do. The pregnant woman has the right to choose
- Most embryos and fetuses do not make it to birth. If God is indeed omnipotent and sovereign, this fact must mean that God causes or allows most embryos and fetuses to die before birth, so God, if he exists, must not be pro-life or anti-abortion, so we shouldn’t be either.
- If abortion is wrong and condemnable, why don’t we penalize God for causing/allowing so many natural “abortions”?
Notice, again, how not a single one of these points is in any way pertaining to the question of the status of the unborn. That’s pretty much all that needs to be said, as I’ve explained above. If an argument in support of abortion’s morality/legality does not engage, at least to some degree, with the question of the status of the unborn, then that argument is just sheerly irrelevant, for primary purposes. But, to be fair, I’ll respond to each of the above points.
1) To see the absurdity of this, consider a corollary: death of fully born humans is frequent and entirely natural. In fact, the death rate of the human species is hovering right around 100% so far. So murder of a fully born human is in keeping “with nature” and hence should be allowed.
If you think that corollary is ridiculous (which it is), then you must reject the same reasoning in relation to abortion. That the unborn die naturally is quite sad and unfortunate, but it hardly makes sense to then turn around and say, “so it’s completely alright for human agency to increase the death rate of the unborn by purposefully terminating unborn lives.” Whether or not some phenomena occur naturally is completely irrelevant to the question of human responsibility in relation to purposefully brining about that same phenomena.
2) Again consider a corollary: If adult humans have dignity (right to life), then who can you blame when they die of natural causes such as heart failure, cancer, illness, etc.? In most cases, you just cannot blame anyone at all; the situation is not something susceptible of “blame” in the first place.
Suppose that an elderly woman gets quite sick with pneumonia, and she is cared for by her elderly husband. The woman fights through the terrible sickness and recovers. But she, completely unintentionally, passes on the sickness to her husband, who ends up passing away as a result. The woman may have been the “cause” of his death in the sense that her having the sickness was the direct reason for him then contracting it and dying therefrom, but one would hardly say that the woman is an any way morally culpable or blameworthy, or that she’s done anything wrong at all. But now suppose that the woman actually hates her husband, and in the middle of some night she smothers him to death. Then she is also the cause of his death, but in this case we would certainly say she has acted reprehensibly and is very much worthy of penalization. In the same way, if a fetus dies naturally in a mother’s woman, it would just be ridiculous to “blame” the mother or anyone for such. But if the mother purposefully and willfully terminates the life, and if the unborn has human “dignity”, then of course what she has done is entirely wrong and blameworthy, and it is just totally irrelevant that the fetus she killed might have died of natural causes anyways.
3) I’ve never encountered a single serious anti-abortion/pro-life argument that contended that abortion is wrong because all sexual intercourse leads to pregnancy and birth. I’d be willing to guess Nye has never encountered a single serious argument to that effect either, and that he really has no idea what he’s talking about.
4) This is question begging. As I’ve repeatedly insisted, if the unborn has human dignity, then terminating the life of the unborn amounts to murder and is wrong and legally condemnable. If the unborn does not have full human dignity, then its status is still left open and needs to be determined. But if abortion amounts to murder, then there is in principle just no such thing as a “right to choose”, anymore than the elderly woman has a “right to choose” to smother her husband in his sleep. So the central, fundamental question still remains, with not attempts to answer or even engage with it.
5/6) These last two arguments make reference to God. As I stated at the beginning, my position does not depend in any way on a theistic framework, and neither do any of my arguments. Some people do make reference to God in support of anti-abortion arguments, so these points might be relevant to them, but not to me or my purposes. In other words, whether or not God exists, and whether or not God’s existence has any bearing on morality, my argument still stands.
To see this, we can once more consider a corollary: Many fully born humans die naturally all the time. If God is omnipotent and sovereign, he must cause or allow all these deaths. So God must not be opposed to murder; hence murder must not be wrong and should be allowed. If you don’t think this is a good argument in favor of murder, then you cannot consider it a good argument in favor of abortion. And still the fundamental question remains: does abortion amount to murder?
But since I do happen to believe in God, and since some people might indeed hold that believing in God commits one to believing that there is nothing wrong with murder, I’ll offer a few responses to these points. There are a number of ways one could go about doing so. The first possible way is note a distinction between what God directly causes to happen, and what God merely allows to happen. If God has created and established a world of order and intelligibility, where secondary causation and cause and effect relationships are real, then it is entirely possible that God allows things to happen without being the direct cause thereof, and that an unfortunate “side-effect” of respecting secondary causation as such is that phenomena like frequent natural death of the unborn occurs. One defending this position might also suggest that God has “good reasons” or “ultimate purposes” in allowing these things to take place.
Another approach, in my mind superior to the first, is just to insist that what is morally obligatory for humans is not necessarily the same as what is morally obligatory for God (if indeed anything at all can be said to be “morally obligatory” for God. I don’t happen to think so, but since this might be a minority opinion I won’t discuss it here). For example, it is (arguably, just for the sake of example) morally obligatory for humans to not engage in pre-marital sexual relations. But it is just nonsensical to apply the same moral obligation to God, since God by definition, as a non-physical Being, is not something even capable of engaging in sexual relations in the first place. So, I’d contend, what God causes or allows to happen himself does not necessarily affect human moral obligations.
If you don’t like or agree with either of these two answers, that’s fine, since I’m not committed here to defending either of them. I offer them merely as possible responses that one might flesh out further. But my original point still stands: the God question is irrelevant to my argument.
Many of the other arguments from Babinski’s post likewise are directed at specifically biblical or theological issues, so I won’t respond to them here, for the same reason just given. My position does not depend upon or even make reference to any biblical or theological support.
Argument 4: Confusion on “souls”.
“If the life of a personʼs eternal soul begins at conception/fertilization yet you freeze a human egg right after it is fertilized, then is that a “soul on ice?” This is not a merely theoretical question, because it happens all the time in fertilization clinics. They mix human sperm and eggs in test tubes and store the fertilized zygotes in a freezer sometimes for years before they are implanted in a womanʼs uterus. The prominent Catholic theologian, Thomas Aquinas, argued that “soul-life” only began several months after conception” .
Response 4: In all honesty, though I think Babinski’s point here strikes closer to the main issue, I fail to understand what argument is actually being made. It seems he’s arguing that the unborn do not have a soul directly at conception and hence that termination thereof isn’t wrong. But this is confusing, because the point is only relevant if someone argues that a soul is what grounds human dignity (which I haven’t). Presumably, Babinski doesn’t think any humans have a soul at any stage, so if he doesn’t think a soul as such is necessary to ground human dignity, why think an argument against fertilized having souls in any way is an argument against anti-abortion generally? In other words, I fail to see how this argument makes any sort of statement on the status of the unborn. It doesn’t even argue that human dignity isn’t grounded in a soul; at most, if successful it might establish that fertilized eggs from conception do not have a soul, but nothing more.
But, to answer his “soul on ice” question: sure, I suppose? It depends on what one means by a soul. I take the soul to be, on an Aristotelian framework, the “form of the body”. At the zygote stage, the “body” is just a single cell, but is still a living organism and hence necessarily has a form, or soul. If freezing preserves the cell and doesn’t destroy it, then it likewise preserves the form and doesn’t destroy it. So I’m not sure how this is works as an argument either way.
And, just to be clear, St. Thomas did indeed think that “soul-life” begins later than conception, but that’s only because, at that time, with limited medical equipment, they did not know that the living organism begins at conception. We now know that it does, as the single celled zygote. If St. Thomas had this knowledge, he most assuredly would have concluded that the soul is present from conception. Either way, St. Thomas also thought that contraception itself in any form is wrong, so even if terminating the pregnancy at conception isn’t “abortion” or murder, he still would have condemned it.
Elsewhere, he asked me a related question: If you can save only a suitcase of one thousand frozen zygotes or a baby from a burning building, which would you save?
In all honesty, I suspect I’d be inclined to save the baby; but once again I fail to see what point that makes. Or, rather, I think I see what point the question is trying to make, but I think it fails entirely to make that point.
The point he’s trying to make is that one would probably save the baby, and this fact supposedly reveals our inherent knowledge that the baby is a “real” human while the zygotes are not. And, admittedly, my intuitions are much more inclined to recognize a baby as human, and to form attachment to that baby, than to a bunch of frozen single celled organisms. But that my intuitions are such doesn’t have any effect on whether or not those zygotes actually possess human dignity or not, which I think they do, for philosophical reasons.
Consider a related challenge: you can save only either a one week old newborn, or a one year old baby, from a burning building. Which do you save? I have no idea, and it’s a horrible question that tells us absolutely nothing about the intrinsic value of the two subjects in question.
To return to the initial questions, I can think of several reasons that one might save the baby over the frozen zygotes. The most obvious might be that the frozen zygotes aren’t even implanted in a uterus, and hence have a very high chance of not surviving anyways, whereas the baby can already survive on its own. Which doesn’t at all mean that the baby is intrinsically more valuable, and it certainly doesn’t mean that one should be allowed to purposefully terminate the life of those zygotes. Once again, the central question still remains: what is the status of the unborn?
Which leads to what is perhaps the only argument I’ve seen from Babinski which attempts any sort of answer to that central, fundamental question.
“Why not admit that wearing a condom leads to the same thing as having an abortion? It’s a matter of where along the continuum of life one determines to cut the cord so to speak. So if one wears a condom one is stopping a potential child’s life just as surely as if one took a morning after pill. The continuum of human life consists of time and coming together. Prior to conception the sperm and egg have to come together, but even after conception it is a matter of time and things coming together, since DNA and proteins have to continue coming together instead of sperm and egg, and also there are the proteins and oxygen from the mother’s bloodstream that have to come together with those of the growing zygote/embryo/fetus at each stage. Sure the distances between the various molecular bits inside and outside the fertilized egg (that continue coming together) is far shorter than the original distance between egg and sperm but what we see are bits continuing to come together. And breaking the continuum of time and bits coming together at any point in that continuum ends a potential human from being born” .
First of all, as a natural law theorist, I do happen to believe that contraception is immoral. But I still think there’s an important distinction between contraception and abortion: namely, one prevents a life and one kills a life. Babinski seems to be contending here that they are equivalent in that they both “stop a potential human from being born”. But this assumes that an unborn child at any state is merely a “potential human”, which is the very issue at hand.
He does, however, seem to offer some attempt at support. He says that just as the sperm and egg have to come together to form the fertilized egg, so even after conception do more factors/conditions have to come together/continue to be met in order for the fertilized egg to develop and eventually be born. And this is correct. It also, again, has no effect whatsoever on the status of the unborn. Is this meant to argue that the unborn do not have human dignity? If so, it fails miserably. For even fully born and fully grown humans require the “coming together” and meeting of a large plethora of various different conditions in order to survive each and every moment. These include things such as gravity, a habitable planet, a habitable universe, food and water and shelter, breathable air, etc. etc. etc. In other words, if requiring various conditions to be met in order to be born renders a fetus “unhuman” (in the sense of not possessing human dignity), then by the same qualification no human at any stage of life can be thought to possess human dignity.
One might insist that the necessary conditions for the fetus have to be met in order for it just to be born, while the necessary conditions for the born human have to be met in order for it just to continue surviving. In other words, this argument might be thought of as maintaining that it is the process of being born that somehow gives the child its human dignity, and hence that prior to birth it lacks such dignity. But Babinski has not given any actual, positive reason for thinking that the process of birth somehow instills dignity on the child. In any case, the fact that the unborn requires certain conditions to be met in order to be born is most certainly not such a reason.
In conclusion, nearly every argument here just entirely misses the primary point of the abortion question. If the unborn has human dignity, then killing it amounts to murder and is thus morally wrong and legally condemnable. If not, then its status still needs to be determined, since it could still be the case that killing it is morally wrong and legally condemnable. But not a single one of the arguments presented here was relevant to this question. I thus cannot help but think that those who present such arguments are either dishonest, or else radically misunderstand the issue.
But, as I said at the beginning, I fully admit that there are much better arguments than those examined here, and that the overall issue itself is much more complex than I’ve made it out to be. It was not my purpose in this post to respond to such arguments; I was merely responding to those presented directly to me, which I hold to be singularly poor.
. Quoted from this article by Babinski: https://edward-t-babinski.blogspot.com/2012/08/abortion-women-and-bible.html
. From video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4IPrw0NYkMg
. Quoted from this article: http://www.centerforinquiry.net/blogs/entry/god_is_the_greatest_abortionist/
. Quoted from Babinski article above
. Quoted from this Facebook post: https://www.facebook.com/edbabinski/posts/10154058227201784
Cover Image: Leonardo da Vinci [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ADa_Vinci_Studies_of_Embryos_Luc_Viatour.jpg>.